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On December 17, 2010, a Tunisian vegetable vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi was approached by a government market inspector, who promptly confiscated his equipment and merchandise, slapped him, and made him a public spectacle. Bouazizi was forced to leave high school early to help support his family and, because of the weak Tunisian economy, he was unable to find legal employment for years. In his desperation he had resorted to selling vegetables illegally. The next day, in protest of the decrepit state of the Tunisian economy and his own hopeless personal future, Bouazizi lit himself on fire in a public square. He died of his injuries 18 days later. Bouazizi’s desperate self-immolation helped trigger a massive popular uprising in Tunisia, resulting in a military coup and the flight of the longstanding dictator, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.

Tunisia’s dire economic and political situation is not unique in the Middle East. From Morocco to Iraq, Middle Eastern countries suffer from an ever-widening rich-poor gap, heavy loans from international financial institutions, a dearth of economic and social opportunity, and entrenched dictators infamous for mismanaging economic resources. Despite this, many international relations scholars and Middle East experts saw the Tunisian revolution as an isolated event—something that had no chance of spreading to other nations. When asked if the Tunisian uprising would launch a revolutionary cascade through the rest of the region, Stephen Walt, a noted international relations professor at Harvard, responded, “Color me skeptical.”

However, on January 25, 2011, experts were proven wrong. A loose coalition of Egyptian opposition movements began a protest that eventually exploded into a peaceful revolution with millions of participants. Egypt—long the powerhouse and cultural center of the Middle East, and long perceived as a bastion of stability in a dynamic region—took to the streets amidst violent police opposition and, in just 18 days, forced President Hosni Mubarak to step down as president.

In the weeks since the January 25 revolution there have been dozens of explanations for Mubarak’s downfall. Political scientists, diplomats, economists, sociologists, and even international aid workers have proposed theories to explain the economic, political, historical, and social causes of the Egyptian revolution. Despite the plethora of interdisciplinary theories in the press and in academia, few—if any—have analyzed Mubarak’s resignation in the light of managerial dynamics and behavior.

In addition to a ripe political environment, horrible economic conditions, and a mobilized and angry population, Mubarak’s fall from power can be attributed to his failure as a public manager. This paper analyzes Mubarak’s managerial strategy throughout the course of his presidency by (1) reviewing the structure of the National Democratic Party (NDP) and Mubarak’s relationship with it; (2) analyzing the foundational principles and assumptions of his strategy, both as the leader of Egypt and as the chairman of the NDP; and (3) tracing the application of that strategy and determining its effectiveness in confronting “the management challenge” over a period of 30 years.

The Purpose of Authoritarian Political Parties

Political parties are a fundamental institution in ruling regimes throughout the world, regardless of the precise form of government. Pluralistic democracies like the US, Europe, and others use political parties to mobilize their populations around important ideological beliefs. Political parties generally allow the population of a nation to have a voice in their government. Parties are also often the means for rising to (or falling from) electoral power—politicians appeal to their party base to gain support. Additionally, parties allow regimes to organize disparate elements in society in order to maintain political order during periods of dramatic socioeconomic change—they are a key prerequisite for political stability and longevity.2

Figure 1: NDP Leadership Organizational Chart, 2010

Political parties are not limited to democracies. The majority of authoritarian regimes—such as China, Venezuela, Iran, Myanmar, and even Moldova and Tajikistan—use parties as a fundamental political institution, albeit with a scope altogether different from democratic parties. Rather than promote political participation or accountability, authoritarian political parties serve to keep the ruler in power. These parties seek to maintain political durability by controlling, manipulating, or managing (1) the nation's elites and (2) the general population: elites are co-opted into an exclusive political apparatus that generally serves as the only vehicle for attaining financial, political, or social success, while the public is disenfranchised and kept apart from the central elite clique.

In the case of Egypt, the NDP was synonymous with the ruling regime. As seen in Figure 1, the party was structured in a way that the leaders of political institutions were simultaneously heads of the party. Mubarak was both the president and the NDP chairman; the NDP secretary-general was Safwat al-Sherif, who was also president of the Shura Council, the upper house of Egypt's parliament. Members of the party's political bureau were mostly members of the People's Assembly, the lower parliamentary house. Likewise, many of the committee secretaries were either cabinet ministers or members of parliament. The NDP was able to guarantee long-term stability and near-permanent longevity by intertwining itself with actual government institutions—the party and the government were inseparable.

The NDP’s Approach to the Management Challenge

Party and regime leaders in both democratic and authoritarian regimes face what can be termed the “management challenge”: the task of efficiently managing dozens of external actors while maintaining stability and meeting organizational objectives (Figure 2). In order for an organization to grow, survive, or profit, a manager must maintain unique relationships with each external actor and attempt to meet (or mitigate) their needs. An organization’s fundamental principles and assumptions guide these relationships and define its managerial strategy. If managers fail to meet (or eliminate) the needs of its external actors, their organizations will fail to grow or survive. Controlling the management challenge is thus a primary responsibility for managers of any organization.

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3. The concept of the “management challenge” has been adapted from Main Event Management Corporation’s Model-Netics management and leadership course, with some adjustments made by Al Haines, former chief administrative officer for the City of Houston.
Egypt's NDP relied on a core of three principles to deal with its management challenge. First, the NDP sought to maintain the public appearance of airtight internal cohesion in its elite ruling clique. In reality, because the NDP was responsible for setting national political and social agendas, opinions of party leaders regularly differed sharply—they were hardly unified in their ideology, beliefs, or strategy. However, Mubarak kept up the appearance of absolute party unity. When intra-elite conflict or disagreements threatened to tear apart the upper echelons of the party, Mubarak would engage in internal reconciliation and conflict management, reaching out to angry business or political leaders and offering influential political positions. The NDP's longstanding image of impenetrability helped it to effectively handle the management challenge—the appearance of a strong and unified central political party allowed Mubarak and the NDP to dissuade opposition parties and other external actors from posing significant threat to the party.

Another principle of Mubarak's NDP management strategy was the practice of controlling and manipulating the growth of the elite circle. Rising figures in Egypt's business and political arenas were forced to comply with NDP desires and expectations to gain additional power. This principle is clearly illustrated with an anecdote from *The Yacoubian Building*, a popular Egyptian novel. One of the novel's main characters, Hagg Muhammad Azzam, is a wealthy businessman who built his power over decades of business acquisitions and drug-dealing. As Azzam's wealth increased, the NDP became more interested in him. Political leaders helped him broker large multi-million dollar business deals and encouraged him to run for office in the People's Assembly. During the electoral process, party leaders approached him with a harsh demand—in

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4. Brownlee, 12.
exchange for NDP assistance in the elections, Azzam was to “contribute” 25% of his company’s profits to the party.

After winning the election, Azzam decided to confront the party leadership to renegotiate the bribe. The party’s secretary-general agreed to arrange a meeting with the “Big Man,” an appellative for Mubarak. The encounter ended horribly for Azzam. The “Big Man” spoke with Azzam from another room (his physical absence lent an air of inaccessibility to the internal NDP structure) and threatened to uncover Azzam’s hidden drug deals if he continued to show ingratitude for the benevolent support the party had given to his business. Azzam, frightened by the prospect of blackmail, left dejected and remained loyal to the party from then on. The NDP had successfully brought him into the party structure as a subservient sub-elite, completely beholden to the party. While Azzam’s experience is fictional, it is representative of the experience dozens of Egyptian businessmen who have been conscripted into NDP service. Mubarak was able to manipulate and control these ambitious external actors, thereby increasing the power and influence of the clique of elites.

The third principle undergirding Mubarak’s approach to the management challenge was its disregard and repression of the general population. Rather than attempt to meet the needs and demands of the people (all 70–80 million of them), the NDP mitigated their power by engaging in a long campaign of violent repression. Immediately following the assassination of Sadat, Mubarak reinstated Law 1958/162, which put the country in a perpetual state of emergency. This emergency law gave Mubarak the legal authority to suspend the constitution, expand police authority, and censor anything the government deemed dangerous. With this legal status, Mubarak was able to incarcerate, disappear, and torture thousands of dissidents and other enemies of the state. The emergency law was often imposed with overwhelming and intimidating force. In November 2008, forty armed state security commandos stormed the apartment of a blogger, confiscated his books, computer, and other possessions—the blogger was detained by state security for three months because of a blog post critical of Mubarak’s regime.

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While the NDP-controlled Ministry of the Interior upheld the perpetual state of emergency, Mubarak also sought to placate the Egyptian people with hints of democracy. Parliamentary elections were held every five years to prove the regime’s democratic nature. However, these elections were hardly representative of the will of the people; they were rigged by party leaders to help smooth over the internal conflict of the party elite. Mubarak used these elections as an opportunity to promote leaders in the party ranks or to co-opt new elites, like the fictional Hagg Azzam, into the party structure.

These underlying management principles and strategies—maintenance of a closed and unified elite clique, manipulation of lower elites, and repression of the Egyptian people—are hardly sound and ethical principles of public administration. However, from 1981 to 2011 they allowed Mubarak to efficiently deal with the difficult management challenge associated with ruling a country as large and diverse as Egypt, keeping the NDP firmly in the center of power.

Three Decades of Evolution in NDP Management

Despite the NDP’s centrality in Egyptian politics, Mubarak struggled to maintain management challenge equilibrium throughout his 30-year tenure. Mubarak was able to lead the NDP through a decade of relative calm in the 1980s and a decade of social and economic upheaval in the 1990s without losing power or undermining the internal cohesion of the party. However, by the 2000s, Mubarak failed to adapt to significant changes in the structure and power of the external actors. His mismanagement led to a gradual collapse in NDP unity, culminating in the breakdown of the party during the 2011 revolution.

Relative calm and stability: the 1980s

In 1978, Egyptian president Anwar el-Sadat disbanded the longstanding Arab Socialist Union (ASU), Gamal 'Abd el-Nasser’s original revolutionary political party. Although he was the chairman of the ASU, and his entire government were party members, Sadat abandoned the ASU in favor of his newly created National Democratic Party. ASU leaders renounced their former party memberships and flocked to the new NDP in droves. The NDP pursued the same policies and had the same faces as the ASU—the change was merely nominal. Sadat only chaired his new party for three years before he was assassinated in 1981 by a radical Islamist angry about his agreement to the Camp David

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8. Brownlee, 12.
Accords. Sadat’s vice president, Hosni Mubarak, declared a state of emergency and took over as president of Egypt and chair of the NDP.

Mubarak’s early years were characterized by parallel management strategies aimed at controlling two powerful external actors (Figure 3). As punishment to the Islamist group that had pursued Sadat’s assassination, Mubarak launched a violent and wide-reaching campaign to weed out all suspected Islamists. Thousands were arrested, detained, and tortured by a newly created special division of the state security apparatus—Intelligence Unit 75. Detainees were stripped naked, blindfolded, handcuffed, and beaten in a 12th century dungeon. The harsh treatment of these thousands of prisoners—guilty and innocent—helped fuel the wave of violent Islamist attacks in the following decade. As horrible and draconian as this reaction was, it can be explained by the third principle of Mubarak’s management strategy—repress the population until they pose no threat to the regime’s stability.

However, even as he asserted his new powers and repressed those opposition groups that posed the largest threat to the stability of the regime, Mubarak allowed for a large measure of relative political opposition. The 1980s were the heyday of institutionalized opposition parties. In the 1984 parliamentary elections, two opposition parties (the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wafd) won 50 of the 444 seats—11% of the total parliament. In 1987 the opposition fared even better. Of the 439 seats, 100 were won by opposition parties (35 each by the Wafd and Muslim Brotherhood, 27 by Labour, and 3 by the Liberals), or 21% of the parliament. Mubarak felt confident in his ability to

12. Ibid., 222.
mitigate any negative effects put forth by the opposition that he allowed them to have a significant voice, thus placating the Egyptian people in the wake of Sadat’s assassination.

Mubarak was also able to maintain strict privacy regarding the internal dynamics of the higher echelons of the NDP. He maintained this unity by quietly mollifying dissent and conflict. Little internal discord was visible to the public and the NDP remained an impregnable and powerful political institution. On the international stage, Mubarak upheld the Camp David Accords, appeasing the United States and Israel, both of which were significant external actors.

Upheaval: the 1990s

The following decade saw the addition of several new powerful external actors to Mubarak’s management challenge (Figure 4). Throughout the 1990s, radical fringe Islamist groups like al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, led by Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman (known as “the blind sheikh”) and Islamic Jihad, led by al-Qaeda’s current second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, launched aggressive and violent campaigns against the government. In August 1993, Islamic Jihad attempted an assassination of interior minister Hasan al-Alfi, and less than a year later made an attempt on Egypt’s prime minister, Atef Sidqi. In June 1995, during a visit to Sudan, the group made a failed attempt on Mubarak himself.

While Islamic Jihad focused on removing political leaders, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya menaced the general Egyptian population. Between 1992 and 1997,

Figure 4: Mubarak’s Management Challenge in the 1990s

13. Wright, 211.
militants from al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya killed over 1,200 Egyptians. The group’s most infamous attack occurred in November 1997, when six militants killed 58 tourists and four Egyptians in a bloody massacre in Luxor. Mubarak clamped down harshly on these Islamic groups, jailing and torturing thousands of suspected Islamists. Hundreds were rounded up after each attack, and immediately after the Luxor massacre, violent Islamic terrorism had all but disappeared, following a brutal government-led counterinsurgency against the most violent groups. As a manager, Mubarak was able to eliminate the influence of the Islamist external actors and maintain organizational stability.

Mubarak also oversaw severe economic upheaval during the 90s as he undertook a radical series of World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)-sponsored structural adjustment reforms. Dozens of state-owned companies were sold off and privatized and state subsidies to the poor were cut dramatically. Mubarak’s reason for these drastic structural adjustment programs was two-fold: (1) he was able to attain funding from international institutions like the IMF, and (2) he increased the power of the NDP by selling state-owned firms to high-level NDP officials, thus indirectly keeping these companies (and their profits) in his control. As he did with the Islamists, Mubarak mitigated any negative effects imposed by the new external actors in the management challenge.

In the face of Islamic terrorism and structural adjustment, Mubarak greatly decreased the amount of permissible political opposition. He closed off the political system, reversing the tolerance of the 1980s, and began to “dictate the time, place, and degree of [all] political openings.” In 1990 opposition parties won 23 seats (14 for the Wafd, 8 for Labour, and 1 Liberal; none for the Muslim Brotherhood), only 7% of parliament. The 1995 elections were far worse—87 people died and 1,500 were injured in violence aimed at intimidating voters. Opposition parties managed to win only 13 seats—a mere 3% (6 for the Wafd, 5 for the Tagammu’, 1 Liberal, and 1 Nasserist).

15. Wright, 292.
16. Ibid., 290–93.
20. Ibid., 222.
21. Ibid., 222–23.
Opposition and uncertainty: the 2000s

In an effort to maintain his control over the management challenge, Mubarak closed off all possible opposition during the 90s, effectively isolating himself from the Egyptian people. His ruthless tactics had a profound effect on the cohesion of the NDP itself. In the 2000s, the shroud of secrecy held over internal dissent within the NDP elite began to be lifted, and the Egyptian people were able to see how fractious the party had become. This new development went against one of the foundational principles of Mubarak’s NDP management strategy—presenting a unified public face for his party to ward off the advances of other external actors. The loss of that impregnability during the 2000s set the stage for the 2011 revolution and defeat of Mubarak. The most pressing addition to Mubarak’s management challenge in the 2000s was precisely this public revelation of internal NDP discord (Figure 5).

During the late 90s, a deep rift emerged within the NDP elite, partially in response to Mubarak’s ruthless management style throughout that decade. The party split into two visible camps: the old guard, made up of ex-ASU leaders who had been involved in Egyptian politics for decades, and the new guard, a new generation of younger political and business leaders who had studied in the United States or Great Britain and who were then asserting themselves in the Egyptian political system. The new guard was hardly unified, despite its opposition to old guard regime figures like the NDP secretary-general Safwat al-Sharif, and even Mubarak himself. There were at least two factions within the new guard: the “liberals from the past” who were in their late 40s and early 50s, and the “new new guard,” made up of highly ambitious, reform-minded politicians in their 30s. Others in the new guard, known as the centrists (Hosam Badrawy, Ahmed ‘Ezz, and even Mubarak’s son Gamal) believed in reform but were unwilling to break from the party.

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Mubarak aligned himself with two NDP factions—the old guard (his peers and long-time allies) and the centrists (his son Gamal and his supporters). Given his advancing age, Mubarak sought to secure his legacy as president by installing his son as president after his death. Because he was being groomed as next president, Gamal Mubarak and his cohort gained significant power, meaning that Mubarak consequently ceded many of his managerial duties to the centrists.

Under the influence of Gamal, President Mubarak’s relationship with external actors changed considerably. In February 2005, Gamal persuaded his father to reform the Egyptian constitution to allow for a direct presidential election, part of Gamal’s proposed “continuous plan of transformation and reform.”23 Gamal and the centrists directed and orchestrated the entire presidential campaign and Mubarak won with 88.6% of the votes.24

Although the presidential elections went according to the centrists’ plans, internal NDP tensions marred the subsequent parliamentary elections. The old guard were highly successful, while reformers—including the Mubarak-backed centrists—suffered heavy losses. One of the chief architects of the presidential campaign, Hosam Badrawy, actually lost his seat in parliament. Badrawy blamed his loss on the struggle between the reformists and the old guard, and expressed his discontent in an interview following the election, stating, “I don’t think the party was serious about supporting me, and there was confusion within the party following instructions issued by the old guard.”25

The burgeoning independent Egyptian press took advantage of these rifts and began to expose them to the public, thus diminishing the all-powerful mystique that had surrounded the NDP in previous decades. Labor unions and political activists became more assertive and launched widespread protests against the NDP and Mubarak. Because he had given much of his managerial power to Gamal, Mubarak was less able to steer the rising influence of the external actors. The disappearance of internal NDP cohesion dealt a major blow to Mubarak’s regime and his ability to respond as a manager, and his management challenge had become extremely problematic by the eve of January 25.

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24. Ibid., 100–101.
The end: January 25–February 11, 2011

On January 18, Asmaa Mahfouz, a young political activist in the April 6 Movement,\(^\text{26}\) posted a video with a desperate call to action.\(^\text{27}\) She encouraged Egypt’s youth to go to Tahrir Square, Cairo’s largest public square, on January 25 to protest against Mubarak and the NDP. April 6 had organized regular protests and demonstrations since its inception in 2008, but turnout had typical been low. To Mahfouz’s surprise, thousands gathered in Tahrir Square on the appointed day. Momentum quickly grew and over the course of the day the crowd numbered in the hundreds of thousands.

Figure 6: Mubarak’s Management Challenge During the 2011 Revolution

The January 25 revolution represented the largest and most difficult confrontation to Mubarak’s management challenge (Figure 6). In former years, Mubarak had sufficient political capital and clout to effectively mitigate or co-opt any new external actors. However, by 2011 he had lost the ability to control the managerial environment due to (1) his age (he was 82 during the revolution), (2) his partial transfer of power to his son Gamal and the internal discord within the NDP, (3) and his total insulation from the demands of the Egyptian people.

During the following 18 days, the regime tried desperately to calm the crowd and force the protestors to return home. State security forces, fiercely loyal to Mubarak, spent several days firing tear gas, water cannons, and rubber-coated

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26. One of the many opposition groups founded in the wake of the fractious 2005 elections.
bullets into the crowds, but their violence seemed to only increase the number of protestors. By Friday, January 28, millions had turned to the streets throughout the entire country—from Alexandria in the north to Aswan in the south.

After several days of protests, Mubarak used one of the key principles of his managerial strategy and attempted to placate the people. He announced that he would immediately dissolve his cabinet and appoint suitable replacements. However, because the NDP and the government are synonymous, the newly appointed cabinet ministers were largely old ministers who Mubarak had just fired. Mubarak’s eleventh-hour cabinet shuffle did not meet the demands of the protestors and they remained in the streets.

On February 5, Mubarak attempted once again to appease the people by unofficially dissolving the main leadership structure of the NDP. He remained party chairman, but appointed Hossam Badrawy—a centrist liberal—as the secretary-general. Key party positions were then refilled with former party leaders. As had happened with the cabinet shuffle the previous week, the protestors were angry about the party shuffle and thousands continued to occupy Tahrir Square.

Mubarak’s last-ditch efforts to stay in power betrayed every principle and assumption of his managerial strategy. For decades, Mubarak had relied on the internal cohesion and unity of the upper echelons of the party and had intentionally disregarded the needs and demands of the people. Faced with overwhelming pressure from the protestors, Mubarak disbanded the government and the party—his key supporting institutions. He was on his own.

By February 10, Mubarak was ready to give up and resign. He arranged to give his resignation speech to the nation that evening. Protestors awaited the speech with euphoria, but were mortified when, two hours after the appointed time, it was finally aired. Rather than resign, an exhausted Mubarak announced that he would remain in power until emergency presidential elections in September. Mubarak had fully intended on resigning, but according to reports from sources close to the ruling family, Gamal persuaded his father to hold out longer.28 The heir-apparent rewrote his father’s speech several times, much to the consternation of his siblings and other ex-NDP officials—he almost came to blows with his younger brother Alaa, and NDP leaders were forced to sepa-

rate them. That evening, Hossam Badrawy resigned as secretary-general in protest of the speech.

The following morning, Mubarak’s vice president, Omar Suleiman, read a brief statement announcing the president’s official resignation and the complete transfer of ruling power to an interim military government. Mubarak’s NDP had officially collapsed in an unceremonious thirty-second press conference.

Conclusion

Mohammed Bouazizi’s death set off a wave of anti-government protests—now known as the “Arab Spring”—that have since moved beyond Tunisia and Egypt. Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, Morocco, and Oman have each faced intense uprisings, and each regime has responded with different strategies to remain in power, with varying degrees of success—Jordan’s King Abdullah shuffled cabinet ministers to successfully placate the demands of the protestors, while Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi has deliberately pushed his country into a bloody civil war. While each of the ongoing Middle Eastern uprisings has been borne from different social, political, historical and economic circumstances, one aspect remains the same in each. Middle Eastern leaders, whose managerial style for the past four decades has been based on the insular management of an elite core and the systematic repression and disenfranchisement of the rest of the population, are struggling to balance the dramatic increase of pressure from external actors. Leaders who fail to adapt to this severe management challenge will ultimately fall from power, as proven by the experience of Hosni Mubarak.

Although the principles and assumptions that formed the foundation of Mubarak’s managerial strategy served him well during the first two decades of his presidency, Mubarak was unable to cope with the rapid and dynamic changes in the social, political, and economic realities that Egypt began to face in the 2000s. As pressure from external actors mounted, Mubarak and the NDP failed to adapt. By February 11, 2011, Mubarak had lost completely control and was forced to flee, to the delight of millions of protesting Egyptians. As a manager, the president had failed to meet the needs of the external actors in his management challenge. Rather than cultivate working relationships with each individual actor, Mubarak manipulated, repressed, or ignored them—actions that led to his ultimate managerial failure.

Middle Eastern leaders today face two options to effectively weather the current Arab Spring: either (1) they must adjust their approach to the rising external actors in their individual management challenges, either by becoming more repressive and violent, or by allowing more opposition and increasing citizen involvement; or (2) they must completely overturn the fundamental assumptions that have underpinned managerial strategy for so many years by dismantling the insular elite circles of the ruling parties and adopting an attitude of accountability and responsiveness towards their citizens. For the sake of millions of Arabs throughout the region, long oppressed by nonresponsive and antagonistic leaders, may these managers choose the latter.

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**Selected Bibliography**


